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By any measure, Farnsworth & Young's Cases and Materials on
Contracts1 is one of the leading American casebooks on contracts,
perhaps the leading casebook. It is the most widely-used American
casebook on the subject, having been adopted at over one hundred
American law schools.2 Its authors are distinguished professors at
Columbia Law School, and Farnsworth is particularly well known as
reporter of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts3 and the author of
the leading modern treatise on contracts.4 The casebook just entered
its fifth edition-itself an achievement in a crowded market in which
some casebooks never make it past a first edition. In fact, the "fifth
edition" is really the ninth edition of a casebook first published by
t Alfred McCormack Professor of Law, Columbia University.
t James L. Dohr Professor of Law, Columbia University.
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus
School of Law, Washington, D.C. My thanks to Tony Perez, Heidi Schooner, Lucia Silecchia,
and Bill Wagner for their helpful comments.
1. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONTRACTS (5th Ed. 1995).
2. See Press Release: More Book News from the Foundation Press, (Foundation Press),
October 1995, at 1 (describing the book as "the bestselling course book in the field"); Foundation
Press, List of Adoptions for Farnsworth & Young, Contracts (5th edition) (listing 103 adoptions
for the 1995-96 school year) (on file with author).
3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS compiler's note (1980). The first reporter
was Professor Robert Braucher, who served until he was appointed to the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts in 1971. See id. Braucher was primarily responsible for Chapters 1-5, part of
Chapter 9, and Chapters 13-15 of the second Restatement. Farnsworth was primarily responsible
for the rest. See also J. Clark Kelso, Book Review, 5 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 335, 335 n.1 (1992)
(reviewing E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, UNITED STATES CONTRACT LAW (1991)).
4. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1990).
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Professor Edwin W. Patterson in 1935, a book that eventually gathered
two co-authors and made it to a fourth edition. 5
Part I of this Review considers the book's merits as a tool for
teaching contract doctrine. In this respect the book excels. Part II
considers it as a tool for introducing students to broader perspectives
on contract law. In this respect the book's success is somewhat less
complete.
I.
The organization of the fifth edition, like that of the fourth, is
generally sensible. It begins with bases for enforcing promises, then
takes up mutual assent, the Statute of Frauds, "policing the bargain,"
remedies, interpretation, performance, breach, impracticability,
frustration, beneficiaries, and assignment and delegation. There is a
certain chronological logic to this order of presentation: it follows the
life of a contract, beginning with formation, moving to defenses, and
finally turning to performance and breach. Obviously the chapter on
remedies violates this logic, but this seems a sensible compromise:
remedies are too important to leave for the last few rushed weeks of
class. Arguably the chapters on beneficiaries and assignment and
delegation belong in the formation part of the book as well; indeed, I
and other professors cover some of this material just before or after the
chapter on the Statute of Frauds. Most professors, however, probably
do not regard these subjects as essential for the first year, so again their
placement in the back of the book is quite sound.6
Although the book saves most of remedies for the middle of the
course, it also introduces remedies in a short opening section.' This
segment immediately precedes the material on enforcing promises. It
is designed to help the students understand what it means to "enforce"
a promise-providing substitutional relief in the form of damages, or
5. See EDWIN W. PATTERSON, GEORGE W. GOBLE & HARRY W. JONES, CONTRACTS:
CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 1957); E. Allan Farnsworth, Casebooks and Scholarships:
Confessions of an American Opinion Clipper, 42 Sw. L.J. 903, 907 (1988) (describing the evolution
of the Patterson casebook); id. at 905 n.3 (noting that Farnsworth & Young is really an update
of the Patterson book); FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 352 n.a (noting that Patterson
was responsible for four editions of the "predecessor" of the casebook).
6. The teacher's manual contains helpful suggestions on what materials can be cut and what
are essential. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CONTRACTS: MANUAL
FOR TEACHERS v-vi (1995). In general, however, the teacher's manual is not the book's greatest
asset. Some new teachers will doubtless be frustrated by the occasional unanswered question in
the manual. It is one of the few teacher's manuals on the market that envisions a Socratic
dialogue between the professor and the casebook editor.
7. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 1-44.
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occasionally specific relief in the form of an injunction. Many teachers,
myself included, skip this section and return to it while covering the
main chapter on remedies. I find that I can introduce these themes by
using the cases on consideration, restitution, and reliance that
immediately follow. Moreover, the cases in that segment either seem
too uninteresting (e.g., White v. Bentkowski) or too rich (e.g., Sullivan
v. O'Connor9) for the first week of class. Sullivan is a great case, but
it raises a variety of issues-for example, intent to be legally
bound-that profit from exposure to the materials on mutual assent in
Chapter Two. The casebook editors envision that we consider Sullivan
at both points,'0 but that seems to slow things down. It is easier to
consider the case all at once.
Even so, Farnsworth & Young have done well to accommodate
different tastes by including this segment on remedies." It does
present some material that can serve as a foundation for more complex
concepts to come. For example, the note on the economics of remedies
usually proves eye-opening for students. It is usually easier for them
to grasp the concept of efficient breach presented here than economic
analysis of formation doctrine. A newcomer to economics can easily
understand why it is inefficient to force parties to adhere to a contract
when everyone would be better off after breach. But a newcomer will
not so easily understand Posner's present-value argument for enforcing
gratuitous promises, which is presented in the section on consideration.
The editors' decision to begin with theories of obligation rather
than mutual assent is eminently sound, but it does raise interesting
pedagogical issues. Consideration doctrine hits the student with a
surprise right away-namely, that the primary basis for enforcement
of a promise is getting something in return, not putting the promise in
writing. This discovery helps the student realize that there is
sometimes a disconnect between the law on the books and the law on
the street. It helps the student understand why people might pay an
attorney to work on a contract problem. Consideration doctrine
8. 155 N.W.2d 74 (Wis. 1967) (holding that breach of contract does not give rise to
punitive damages), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 14.
9. 296 N.E.2d 183 (Mass. 1973) (holding plastic surgeon liable on promise to provide
plaintiff with a more beautiful nose, and imposing "reliance" damages), reprinted in FARNSWORTH
& YOUNG, supra note 1, at 7.
10. See FARNSWORTH & YOUNG supra note 1, at 147-48 (referring back to Sullivan and
adding three notes to the case).
11. Of course, theirs is not the only casebook to use this approach. See, e.g., ROBERT S.
SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY,
DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 33-43 (1992) (providing a general introduction to theories of
obligation and remedies).
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induces in many students a healthy skepticism about the wisdom of
legal doctrine. And it disabuses them of the notion that the study of
contracts will be a tedious exercise in formalism, in memorizing rules
about fine print. Consideration doctrine is also useful for teaching
case-reading skills. It is an excellent vehicle for teaching how to draw
relevant (and irrelevant) distinctions between cases. With a little
prodding, students prove remarkably adept at distinguishing a case like
Webb v. McGowin12 from a case like Mills v. Wyman. 3
That said, there is an equally strong case to be made for starting
with mutual assent rather than consideration. Most contract teachers
seem to agree that offer and acceptance is more accessible than
consideration doctrine, which suggests it might serve as a better
introduction to the course. A number of other casebooks'--includ-
ing the forerunner to Farnsworth & Young itself"-have taken this
tack. Like consideration doctrine, offer and acceptance soon teaches
the student that there is more to contract than memorizing what goes
in fine print and that the law is not a collection of immutable bright-
line rules. One problem with mutual assent is that it is an enormous
topic; covering it first might prolong it unnecessarily because class
moves slowly at the outset. Knapp and Crystal,' 6 however, have
managed to address this problem by treating "classical" offer and
acceptance law in their first full chapter, and saving more complex
modern problems-options, the "battle of the forms," precontractual
12. 168 So. 196 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935), cert. denied 168 So. 199 (Ala. 1936) (enforcing a
promise to reward promisee for having saved promisor's life), reprinted in FARNSWORTH &
YOUNG, supra note 1, at 68.
13. 3 Pick. 207 (Mass. 1825) (declining to enforce father's promise to reward Good
Samaritan for having sheltered and cared for father's dying son), reprinted in FARNSWORTH &
YOUNG, supra note 1, at 67. Unfortunately, this new edition of the casebook has chopped Mills
down to a one-page "note case," omitting the court's discussion of moral obligations that can be
enforced, and even omitting the court's colorful reference to "the internal forum, as the tribunal
of conscience has been aptly called..." Compare id. with E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM
F. YOUNG, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 118-20 (4th ed. 1988) (providing a full report
of the case) [hereinafter FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, (4th ed.)].
Then again, my fondness for Mills may be getting the best of me. See generally Geoffrey R.
Watson, In the Tribunal of Conscience: Mills v. Wyman Reconsidered, 71 TUL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1997) (asserting that the father did not make the promise the court said he made,
that the son did not die when the court said he did, and that the law did not mandate the result
the court said it did).
14. See, e.g., CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 25-61 (3d ed. 1993) (taking up mutual assent before
consideration); THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 1-155 (2d ed. 1993) (similar).
15. See generally PATTERSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 1-234 (taking up offer and acceptance
first).
16. KNAPP & CRYSTAL, supra note 14.
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liability, and the "agreement to agree"-for a later chapter.1 7  This
approach seems just as workable as Farnsworth & Young's solution.
Having begun with theories of obligation, the fifth edition of
Farnsworth & Young does a good job of choosing and editing relevant
cases, though perhaps not as good a job as the fourth edition. The
segment on consideration begins with Hamer v. Sidway,8 an old
chestnut that combines entertaining facts with a "benefit-detriment"
theory of consideration.19 As a vehicle for teaching doctrine, Hamer
is not perfect: one is forced almost to teach against the case, to rely on
the notes following Hamer to show the students the rise of the bargain
theory. But as a vehicle for introducing students to the study of law,
Hamer is terrific. For one thing, its vintage resonates with tradition.
Students almost seem to expect their first contracts case to be a dusty
old case with quirky facts, and Hamer fits the bill. For another, the
meandering procedural history of the case, including the assignment of
claims and appointment of an executor, provides good practice in case-
reading skills. Moreover, the simple facts provide a great running
hypothetical for illustrating problems like the conditional gift promise.
The cases in the rest of the chapter are also well chosen, but there
are some exceptions. Fiege v. Boehm,2° the case following Hamer,
seems an odd choice. Fiege involves forbearance to assert an invalid
claim, a problem well worth covering, but the claim in question is for
bastardy-a subject that nervous first-year students (and instructors)
may not feel comfortable discussing on the second day of class. The
fourth edition used Fiege but also included State v. Bryant,21 a claim-
17. Compare KNAPP & CRYSTAL, supra note 14, at 25-61 (covering classical offer and
acceptance) with PATTERSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 183-292 (covering modem approaches to
mutual assent).
I cannot offer any scientific evidence that one topic is a better starting place than another.
For what it is worth, at the end of my contracts course, I always poll my students on whether the
course should begin with theories of obligation, mutual assent, or remedies. I always get about
half the class favoring theories of obligation, about half the class favoring mutual assent, and a few
students favoring remedies. But of course my polling sample is suspect. My students have
learned contracts in "chronological" order but have never tried a remedies-first arrangement.
They may simply have become accustomed to a poor situation, much like hostages who come to
sympathize with their captors.
18. 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891) (enforcing uncle's promise to pay nephew $5,000 in exchange
for nephew's abstaining from alcohol, tobacco, and gambling), reprinted in FARNSWORTH &
YOUNG, supra note 1, at 47.
19. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 121-122 n.34 (1974) (asserting
that Hamer illustrates the New York courts' rejection of the bargain theory).
20. 123 A.2d 316 (Md. 1956), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 55.
Fiege also graced Patterson's version of the book. See PATTERSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 297.
21. 697 P.2d 858 (Kansas 1985), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG (4th ed.), supra note
13, at 54.
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settlement case that covered the same doctrine in a more neutral
setting.
More regrettably, the fifth edition has omitted East Providence
Credit Union v. Geremia,22 a difficult but instructive promissory
estoppel case. In Geremia, a couple supposedly relied to their
detriment on a credit company's "promise" to renew their car
insurance policy for them. The case can be used to ask whether the
company's "promise" was really a threat, and whether the law should"enforce" threats that the threat-maker reasonably expects will induce
reliance. (If I promise to break your knees, and you rely on my
promise by investing in a security fence, am I liable to you if I break
my "promise"?)23 Geremia can also be used to introduce the concept
of the moral hazard, as well as to present a difficult consideration issue,
well worth some review time in class. Geremia will be missed.
Finally, the cases in this chapter have been re-arranged.
Restitution doctrine now follows consideration doctrine and precedes
promissory estoppel doctrine. At first this re-ordering might seem
confusing, but the restitution materials flow quite nicely from the
moral-obligation cases that immediately precede them.
The chapter on mutual assent24 is very well done. It opens with
Lucy v. Zehmer,5 which is an excellent introduction to the objective
theory of contract. It then moves to cases on offer and acceptance,
most of which are a few decades old, and all of which are instruc-
tive.26 Next the book takes up termination of the power of accep-
tance. Unfortunately, the old classic Dickinson v. Dodds,27 a main
case in the fourth edition, has been reduced to a few excerpts in this
22. 239 A.2d 725 (R.I. 1968), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG (4th ed.), supra note
13, at 99.
23. This hypothetical is loosely based on a series of hypotheticals posed by Professor Tom
Holdych in his contracts class at Seattle University School of Law.
24. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 138-285.
25. 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954) (enforcing contract scrawled on the back of a restaurant check,
even in the face of evidence that the seller was "high as a Georgia pine"), reprinted in
FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 140.
26. Almost all of these cases also appeared in the fourth edition, and many of them also
appeared in Patterson's version of the book. See, e.g., PATTERSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 1-3
(reprinting Owen v. Tunison, 158 A. 926 (Me. 1932)); id. at 6-7 (reprinting Craft v. Elder &
Johnston Co., 38 N.E.2d 416 (Ohio 1941)); id. at 26 (reprinting Harvey v. Facey, [1893] A.C.
552); id. at 31 (reprinting Fairmount Glass Works v. Crunden-Martin Woodenware Co., 51 S.W.
196 (Ky. 1899)); id. at 95 (reprinting International Filter Co. v. Conroe Gin, Ice & Light Co., 277
S.W. 631 (Texas 1925)).
27. 2 Ch. Div. 463 (1876) (declining to enforce promise to hold an offer open for lack of
consideration, and giving effect to an indirect revocation of the offer).
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edition.28 This may reflect the authors' conviction that the "rule" on
indirect revocation in the case is of limited importance.29 But the case
also illustrates the common law's requirement that an option be
supported by consideration, and even the indirect-revocation rule is a
nice display of the fine lines drawn by classical offer and acceptance
law. Now a new case, Toys, Inc. v. EM. Burlington Company,3 ° is
designed to introduce students to the option contract. It is adequate
but more time-consuming than Dickinson. Thankfully, the authors
have not tampered with the best problem in the book, the contracts-
and-ethics problem of the "Philadelphia lawyer."31  This sly conun-
drum tests the student's understanding of death as revocation as well
as unilateral and bilateral contracts, and forces the student to think
about how much law the lawyer can ethically communicate to the
client if knowledge of the law will influence the client's "memory."
The problem always works well in class.
The section on UCC section 2-20732 gives the students their first
extended look at a statute, albeit a confused statute. This attention to
the Code is laudable. The materials are challenging, perhaps too
challenging for some students. For example, this edition replaces St.
Paul Structural Steel Co. v. ABI Contracting, Inc., 33 a difficult case on
the knock-out doctrine, with Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse
Technology,34 an even more difficult case involving shrink-wrap on
computer software. Still, this is a very strong section of the book.
The third chapter, on the Statute of Frauds, has been improved
by the addition of a case distinguishing between a suretyship arrange-
ment (which is within the Statute) and a third-party beneficiary
contract (which is not).35 The inclusion of this case increases the
temptation to cover third-party beneficiaries early in the
course-ideally, just before embarking on this chapter. Some
instructors, on the other hand, are probably inclined to lecture on the
Statute and leave this chapter to outside reading, or perhaps to cover
28. Compare FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 207-08 (excerpting Dickinson) with
FARNSWORTH & YOUNG (4th ed.), supra note 13, at 177-80 (reprinting most of Dickinson).
29. See FARNSWORTH & YOUNG (4th ed.), supra note 13, at 180 (noting the "paucity of
cases" applying this aspect of the holding in Dickinson).
30. 582 A.2d 123 (Vt. 1990), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 202.
31. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 219.
32. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 223-48.
33. 364 N.W.2d 83 (N.D. 1985), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG (4th ed.), supra
note 13, at 206.
34. 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 230.
35. See FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 291-92 (excerpting Langman v. Alumni
Association of the University of Virginia, 442 S.E.2d 669 (Va. 1994)).
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only the first two or three sections of the chapter in class. Again, the
authors have prudently included more material than most teachers will
have time to cover, leaving room for different choices about coverage.
Chapter Four, on policing the bargain, contains material that is
inherently fascinating, but it occasionally suffers from poor organiza-
tion. The materials on capacity are excellent. One wonders, however,
why the notes to Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Board36 make no
reference to the revealing transcript of the trial published by Richard
Danzig.37  Capacity is followed by "conventional controls" on
unfairness and overreaching-i.e., the pre-existing duty rule and other
variants of the consideration doctrine, plus duress, fraud, misrepresen-
tation, and concealment. The cases in this section are well-selected
and tightly-edited.
The section on adhesion contracts, however, rambles on for almost
seventy pages.3 The case selection here is fine, but the cases are
separated by several distracting two- and three-page notes, sometimes
on subjects that cannot be treated with any rigor in the first year.
Examples of notes that seem unnecessary include the note on insurance
marketing,39 the note on warranties and loss limitations,40 the note
on hell-or-high-water clauses,41 and perhaps the note on cooling-off
periods.42 Those notes that are most relevant to the first-year course
are scattered throughout the chapter. There are separate notes on form
43 14contracts, exculpatory terms,44 ticket stubs,4" "general problems
of policing, 46 the duty to read,47 unconscionability under the Uni-
form Commercial Code,48 competing views of unconscionability, 49
price unconscionability,5" and franchise relations."' Much of this
could have been consolidated into a single essay on contracts of
36. 250 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1969), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at
329.
37. See RiCHARD DANZIG, THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW 161-201
(1978).
38. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 386-454.
39. Id. at 416-418.
40. Id. at 423-426.
41. Id. at 438-439.
42. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 439-441.
43. Id. at 394.
44. Id. at 397.
45. Id. at 399.
46. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 411.
47. Id. at 413.
48. Id. at 418.
49. Id. at 420.
50. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 435.
51. Id. at 451.
284 [Vol. 20:277
1997] Farnsworth & Young
adhesion, perhaps presented at the outset of the chapter.5 2 Still,
despite these organizational problems, the chapter works well. The
editors have presented more than enough raw material for an engaging
week or so of class.
Chapter Five, on remedies, also presents organizational difficulties,
if only because some highly relevant material was already presented in
the introduction to Chapter One. But in general this chapter marches
along at an exciting pace. The introductory cases on measuring
expectation are challenging; they introduce Code remedies,53 and they
cover topics like overhead 4 and the lost-volume seller, 5 subjects
often relegated to an upper-level commercial law course. Most
instructors probably lack the time to cover all of them, but if time
permits, these cases can be very rewarding to teach and study. The
next section, on limitations on damages, contains all the usual suspects,
and they are exceptionally well-arranged and well-edited. Parkingham
County v. Luten Bridge Co.56 introduces Parker v. Twentieth Century-
Fox Film Corp.;57 Jacob & Youngs v. Kent"8 introduces Groves v.
John Wunder Co.59 and the notorious Peevyhouse6" case; and of
course Hadley v. Baxendale6" puts in a command performance. The
52. By contrast, the final section of the chapter, on illegality, is crisply edited. The case
selection is defensible: the editors have chosen cases that involve the most common problems of
illegality, most notably cases on covenants not to compete. See, e.g., Hopper v. All Pet Animal
Clinic, 861 P.2d 531 (Wyo. 1993), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 456;
Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28 (Tenn. 1984), excerpted in
FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 461.
The book does devote one note to surrogacy contracts, FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note
1, at 455-56, but it provides only brief excerpts of the leading cases on the subject. A full report
of In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), would give students a nice midcourse change of pace
and perhaps spark their interest in family law, As it is, the case is discussed in one paragraph.
53. See Laredo Hides Co., Inc. v. H & H Meat Products Co., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 210 (Texas
1974), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 490.
54. See Vitex Manufacturing Corp. v. Caribtex Corp., 377 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1967),
reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 486.
55. See R.E. Davis Chemical Corp. v. Diasonics, Inc., 826 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1987),
reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 494.
56. 35 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1929), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at
506.
57. 474 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1970), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 508.
58. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 520.
59. 286 N.W. 235 (Minn. 1939), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at
526.
60. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 906 (1963), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 532.
61. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 534.
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chapter concludes with a compact but challenging section on liquidated
damages, including an enlightening problem on disguised penalties.62
The remaining five chapters live up to the high standard set by
the first five. Chapter Six, on interpretation, opens with a tight, well-
integrated treatment of the parol evidence rule.63 Some instructors no
doubt regret the new edition's omission of Wisconsin Knife,64 in which
Posner and Easterbrook square off over no-oral-modification clauses
and UCC section 2-209, but, while the case is enlightening, most
teachers probably did not have time for it anyway. (My one experi-
ment with the case took me a class and a half.) The main body of the
chapter contains old and not-so-old favorites like Frigaliment,6 Pacific
Gas,66 and Raffles v. Wichelhaus,67 the case of the two ships Peerless.
Here, thankfully, the editors do take the time to expose the students to
Simpson's critique of Gilmore's suppositions about the historical
background of Raffles.6" The materials on gap-fillers 69 are surpris-
ingly thorough, probably too thorough for most instructors.
Chapter Seven treats performance and breach in a logical fashion.
It begins with extensive and useful materials on conditions, as well as
doctrines that mitigate the harsh effects of conditions. It then turns to
breach and anticipatory repudiation. Like Chapter Six, this chapter
devotes a fair amount of attention to the UCC, attention that I find
welcome.
Chapter Eight, covering mistake, frustration, and impracticability,
may be terra incognita to instructors who have fewer than five or six
hours to teach the course. This is unfortunate: it is one of the best
chapters in the book. The new mistake cases focus the issue more
clearly than the materials in the previous edition. The section on
impracticability preserves the sensible structure of the previous edition,
presenting Taylor v. Caldwell7" (the case in which the music hall
62. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 562 n.5.
63. Id. at 565-581.
64. Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1986),
reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG (4th ed.), supra note 13, at 559, cited in FARNSWORTH &
YOUNG, supra note 1, at 581.
65. Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. International Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116
(S.D.N.Y. 1960), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 585.
66. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641
(Cal. 1968), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 597.
67. 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ct. of Exch. 1864), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra
note 1, at 592.
68. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 594 (excerpting A.W.B. Simpson, Contracts
for Cotton to Arrive: The Case of the Two Ships Peerless, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 287, 324 (1989)).
69. Id. at 611-663.
70. 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (1863), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 806.
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bums down) and Transatlantic Financing Corporation v. United
States7 (one of the Suez cases). The section on frustration is just as
rich; most instructors will have a hard time deciding what material to
cut. Krell v. Henry,72 the coronation case, is a must in an election
year.
The last two chapters also teach well, and I have always been
willing to cut earlier material to make room for them. Chapter Nine,
on third-party beneficiaries, is organized so that the instructor can
teach the basics by assigning only the first set of materials,73 which
cover creditor and donee beneficiaries. Chapter Ten, on assignment
and delegation, contains materials from both the common law and
UCC Article 9. The former are readily accessible to first-year
students; the latter may be asking a bit much, particularly at the end
of a long year. Still, I have on occasion assigned some of the Article
9 material, and on occasion some of my students have understood it.
The Sally Beauty74 case is an excellent introduction to delegation
doctrine, and Posner's dissent may help convince some students that
at least one judge really does use economic analysis in his opinions.
Taken as a whole, Farnsworth & Young is a superb casebook for
teaching contract doctrine as well as basic case- and statute-reading
skills. The authors have organized the material logically, and they
have chosen cases that students find surprisingly interesting. The
book's style is traditional: the notes that follow cases tend to ask
questions rather than answer them. They are not nearly as extensive
as the explanatory notes that follow cases in a casebook like Knapp &
Crystal.7" Some instructors will object that the notes mystify contract
law, but I see virtue in the book's insistence that students reason things
through for themselves. As for the book's scope, it is not encyclope-
dic; it leans in favor of excluding rather than including extra cases, and
in favor of shorter rather than longer excerpts. If on occasion this has
led to an unfortunate redaction-for example of Mills v. Wyman and
Dickinson v. Dodds--on the whole it is welcome, particularly for
instructors who like to teach a couple of cases per class. The book can
be used both by the teacher who likes extended exegesis of cases and
by the teacher who prefers to use cases as a point of departure for
71. 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (J. Skelly Wright, J.), reprinted in FARNSWORTH &
YOUNG, supra note 1, at 812.
72. 2 K.B. 740 (Ct. App. 1903), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 834.
73. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 863-878.
74. Sally Beauty Co. v. Nexxus Products Co., 801 F.2d 1001 (7th Cir. 1986), reprinted in
FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 952.
75. KNAPP & CRYSTAL, supra note 14.
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hypotheticals. The book also should be applauded for its unstinting
commitment to teaching some of the UCC in the first year. Law
schools do not teach enough statute-reading skills in the first year. As
a vehicle for teaching contract doctrine, and for case and statutory
analysis, Farnsworth & Young is first-rate.
II.
Of course, the first-year course in contracts should teach more
than doctrine and case- and statute-reading skills. Law professors have
an obligation to expose students to broader perspectives on the law.
Well-rounded lawyers should know something about economic
analysis, legal history, and jurisprudence. Law school is, for most
lawyers, their only exposure to the philosophical, historical, and
economic foundations of the law. As Holmes put it, we should give
our students a chance to "catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its
unfathomable process, a hint of the universal law."76  A contracts
casebook can facilitate this endeavor by providing excerpts from the
great works on contract law. Farnsworth & Young succeeds in this
task, but its success is incomplete.
The book's most significant contribution to a broader understand-
ing of contract law is its generous use of economic analysis. Economic
analysis pervades this book, albeit in relatively small dollops. The
book wastes no time in raising the subject: the theory of efficient
breach first appears on page 20, and an economic analysis of specific
performance and transaction costs appears on page 37. Even instruc-
tors who skip this first section still encounter Adam Smith77 and the
economics of gratuitous promises on the first day or two of class.
Later there are more notes on the economics of remedies, 7 and
economic analysis of many other issues, including opportunity cost,79
information costs,80 duress,8 ' disclosure,12 covenants not to com-
76. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 478 (1897),
reprinted in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 202 (1920).
77. "[M]an has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is vain for him
to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their
self-love in his favour, and shew them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he
requires of them.... We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and
never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages. Nobody but a beggar chooses
to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens." ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY
INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 11 (Oxford, Clarendon Press
1811), quoted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 53.
78. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 485-86, 531.
79. Id. at 317.
80. Id. at 347-48.
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pete, 3  "efficient reliance," 4  "best efforts" clauses," employer
liability for termination of an employee,86 constructive conditions and
opportunism,87 and waiver-of-defense clauses.88 In addition, eco-
nomic analysis turns up in a few cases, including cases on the lost-
volume seller 9 and delegation doctrine.9
This is not to suggest that the authors have appended economic
analysis to every section of the book. The section on restitution, for
example, contains little on the economics of restitution,9' just as the
chapter on offer and acceptance contains little on the game theory of
dickering. 92 But the book is still a rich source of materials on
economic analysis. Given the enormous influence of economic analysis
on contracts scholarship, the inclusion of at least some of this material
seems essential. Even instructors who find economic analysis
unrevealing should concede that it is useful to introduce the student to
the subject, especially in a course on voluntary private exchange of
goods and services. For those of us who find economic analysis useful,
the book's emphasis on economics is welcome indeed.
The book's treatment of legal history is less comprehensive, but
still more than adequate. The first historical analysis in the book is a
readable excerpt from Farnsworth's treatise; it relates to the develop-
ment of equitable relief.93 Instructors who skip this material often
start the course with the historical note on the development of the
81. Id. at 370-71.
82. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 375-76.
83. Id. at 466.
84. Id. at 486.
85. Id. at 629.
86. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 650.
87. Id. at 701-02.
88. Id. at 968-69.
89. R.E. Davis Chemical Corp. v. Diasonics, Inc., 826 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1987), reprinted
in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 494.
90. Sally Beauty Co. v. Nexxus Products Co., 801 F.2d 1001, 1008-1011 (1986) (Posner,
J., dissenting), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 955.
91. Cf., e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans
and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUDIES 83, 109-18
(1978) (discussing the economics of rescue); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 97-98 (2d ed. 1977) (similar), reprinted in ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 59 (1979) (arguing that restitution doctrine
enforces the deal the parties would have made but for "prohibitive" transaction costs).
92. See, e.g., Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and
the Law of Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 215 (1990) (applying game theory to various
aspects of formation, including the rule that silence is not acceptance).
93. E.A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.4 (2d ed. 1990), excerpted in FARNSWORTH &
YOUNG, supra note 1, at 38-40.
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forms of action and modem theories of obligation.94 This is a
challenging passage, and it tends to befuddle my students; I often urge
them to return to it after we've covered the rest of the chapter. But I
am glad for its inclusion in the book, for it is rewarding if studied
carefully.
A later note describes Lord Mansfield's unsuccessful efforts to
reform the doctrine of consideration." There are brief historical
sketches of the rise and decline of the Statute of Frauds.96 A note
after Raffles v. Wichelhaus97 draws attention to Gilmore's speculation
about the state of international cotton markets at the time of Raffles,
as well as Simpson's exhaustive article critiquing Gilmore's specula-
tion.9 9  There are helpful notes on Maine's Ancient Law,100 the
development of substantial performance doctrine,10' impracticability
doctrine,0 2 third-party beneficiary doctrine," 3 the actual facts of
Lawrence v. Fox,"° and the law of negotiable instruments.0 5
As with economic analysis, some additional historical analysis
comes from the cases themselves: cases like Kingston v. Preston,'
Lawrence v. Fox,'0 7 and even Hadley v. Baxendale'08 are as interest-
ing for the historical development they represent as the doctrine they
embody. On occasion, one wishes for more excerpts from contempo-
rary historical scholarship, such as Danzig's work on Hadley or
Simpson's elaborate critique of Horwitz's history of contract law."°
94. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 44-47.
95. Id. at 60-61.
96. Id. at 286-87, 322-23.
97. 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ct. Exchequer 1864), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra
note 1, at 594.
98. Farnsworth & Young, supra note 1, at 594 (excerpting GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH
OF CONTRACT 35-39 (1974)).
99. Id. (excerpting Simpson, supra note 68, at 324).
100. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW, New York, Henry Holt and Company
1906, excerpted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 396-97.
101. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 707-08.
102. Id. at 805-06.
103. Id. at 863-64.
104. 20 N.Y. 268 (1859), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 869-70.
105. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 961-62.
106. 99 Eng. Rep. 437 (K.B. 1773), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1,
at 700.
107. 20 N.Y. 268 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1859), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note
1, at 865.
108. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ct. Exchequer 1854), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra
note 1, at 534.
109. See Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law,
4 J. LEGAL STUDIES 249 (1975), reprinted in DANZIG, supra note 36, at 76; A.W.B. Simpson, The
Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1979) (critiquing Morton
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But there is enough here to give the student a glimpse of the ghost of
Contracts past.
So-called "traditional" contracts scholarship is adequately
represented in the book. (By "traditional" scholarship, I mean
commentary that focuses on the wisdom of legal doctrine without
relying heavily on economic, historical, religious, philosophical,
feminist, gay, lesbian, or critical perspectives.) Holmes, Williston,
Corbin, Llewellyn, Fuller, Dawson, Gilmore, and Farnsworth all put
in guest appearances in the notes and, sometimes, in the cases
themselves."' But even these commentators get relatively little air
time. Rarely is a commentator allotted more than one or two
paragraphs; usually, commentary is relegated to nine-point type in the
notes, or even eight-point type in the footnotes."' For example, the
editors quote only one or two paragraphs from Gilmore's Death of
Contract,"' and then only in notes. By contrast, casebooks like
Fuller & Eisenberg's Basic Contract Law routinely excerpt commentary
in the "main text" rather than the notes." 3  The point is not that
commentary is ignored, but that it is accorded secondary importance.
Moreover, "nontraditional" scholarship gets particularly short
shrift in the book. The book seems to reflect Professor Farnsworth's
skepticism about new "grand theories" of contract law.'14 Feminist
jurisprudence is almost entirely ignored. One note deals with gender
and racial discrimination in auto sales.'1 5 A footnote to Parker v.
J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modem Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1974)).
The Horwitz thesis itself does get a brief airing in an early note in the casebook. FARNSWORTH
& YOUNG, supra note 1, at 47.
110. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 135 n.2 (quoting Corbin and
Llewellyn on Cardozo); id. at 569 (Corbin on the parol evidence rule); id. at 708 n.2 (Corbin on
willful breach); id. at 62 (Dawson on consideration); id. at 82 n.1 (Dawson on restitution); id. at
38-40 (Farnsworth on specific performance); id. at 72 n.1 (Fuller on consideration as form); id.
at 107 n.4 (Gilmore on the death of contract); id. at 51-52 n.2 (Holmes on the bargain theory);
id. at 101 (Holmes on reliance); id. at 369 n.2 (Holmes on duress); id. at 135 n.2 (Corbin and
Llewellyn on Cardozo); id. at 68 n.1 (Williston on moral obligation); id. at 86 n.2 (Williston on
consideration); id. at 218 (Williston on death of the offeror); id. at 733 (Williston on the breaching
plaintiff, quoted in Kirkland v. Archibold, 113 N.E.2d 496 (Ct. App. Ohio 1953)).
111. The editors were kind enough to reveal these point sizes in the casebook itself (FARNS-
WORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 402 n.b). They did so in order to illustrate the size of the
type in the form contract in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
112. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974), quoted in FARNSWORTH &
YOUNG, supra note 1, at 107, 594.
113. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW
2-3 (6th ed. 1996) (excerpting JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 342-47 (1971)).
114. See E. Allan Farnsworth, A Fable and a Quiz on Contracts, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 208
(1987), quoted in A CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY 91 (Peter Linzer ed., 1989).
115. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 437, n.3.
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Twentieth-Century Fox"6 highlights Frug's critique of the case in her
article on Dawson, Harvey & Henderson. 1 7  But other interesting
feminist scholarship goes unmentioned."' Similarly, the Critical
Legal Studies scholars and the Critical Race theorists are largely absent
from this book.'19 Religious perspectives are also missing. There is
some interesting work on the relationship between religion and contract
that deserves attention in the book. 20 And the casebook makes
relatively few references to foreign contract law or to comparative
scholarship generally. 2 ' Its treatment of international law is limited
to the Convention on the International Sale of Goods. 22
The casebook would profit from more frequent references to this
kind of interdisciplinary work. By referring to some of this scholar-
116. 474 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1970), reprinted in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 508.
117. See Mary Jo Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook,
34 AM. U. L. REV. 1065, 1116 (1985), cited in FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 513.
118. See e.g., Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE
L.J. 997 (1985); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed
Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987); RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT)LAW:
SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW (1992); Mary Jo Frug, Rescuing Impossibility Doctrine:
A Postmodern Feminist Analysis of Contract Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1029 (1992); Margaret Jane
Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). See also Kellye Testy, An Unlikely
Resurrection, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 219 (1995) (describing the work of lesbian scholars).
119. One exception is MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW, 1780-1860 (1977), which pops up a couple of times.
120. See, e.g., Harold J. Berman, The Religious Sources of General Contract Law: An
Historical Perspective, 4 J. LAW & RELIGION 103 (1986); Andrew W. McThenia, Jr., Religion,
Story and the Law of Contracts: Reply to Professor Berman, 4 J. LAW & RELIGION 125 (1986);
Kristin L. Peters Hamlin, The Impact of Islamic Revivalism on Contract and Usury Law in Iran,
Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, 22 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 351 (1987); Judith A. Shapiro, Note, The Shetar's
Effect on English Law--A Law of the Jews Becomes the Law of the Land, 71 GEO. L.J. 1179 (1983).
Farnsworth & Young does not wholly ignore religion, however. Two fascinating notes on
gap-filling compare the case of the "cantor who wouldn't" with the case of the "cantor who
couldn't." Fisher v. Congregation B'Nai Yitzhok, 110 A.2d 881 (Pa. Super. 1955) (interpreting
contract to officiate as cantor in accordance with Jewish law) and Tucker v. Forty-Five Twenty-
Five, 199 So. 2d 522 (Fla. App. 1967) (quoting the Passover Haggadah, and then paraphrasing
it: "Wherein is a contract for the performance of a Passover Seder different from all other
contracts?"). FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 660.
121. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 306-
339 (2d ed. 1994) (collecting materials on comparative contract law).
122. The UNIDROIT principles and other international instruments would be of interest
to a first-year student with an international bent. Even public international law holds some
lessons for private contract law. I have argued elsewhere that treaty law provides a useful analogy
to contract law. See Geoffrey R. Watson, The Death of Treaty, 55 OHIO STATE L.J. 781, 794-95
(1994). In my view, some doctrines of treaty law-such as its rejection of the consideration
doctrine-should be imported into American contract law. See Watson, supra note 13. But cf.
EVANGELOS RAFTOPOULOS, THE INADEQUACY OF THE CONTRACTUAL ANALOGY IN THE
LAW OF TREATIES 207-54 (1990) (arguing that treaties resemble legislation more than contracts);
SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 1945-1986 at 128 (1989)
(arguing that the analogy between treaty and contract is "simply false").
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ship, the book would show the student that different people think
about contracts in radically different ways, and it would encourage
students to think critically about commentary. To be sure, the
instructor can always supplement a casebook with law review articles
and the like, but the ideal casebook would stand alone, with no need
of amendment. Lest I be charged with an excess of political correct-
ness, I should add that I share the editors' enthusiasm for economic
analysis; it is one of my principal teaching tools. I simply think the
book would be enriched by more frequent acknowledgment of
competing frames of analysis.
In this respect the casebook resembles Farnsworth's treatise on
contracts, which has been generally praised for its treatment of doctrine
but criticized for failure to draw on modem contracts scholarship'23
and for lack of a larger vision.'24 As Famsworth himself points out,
there was a time when a casebook editor would have been considered
self-indulgent for including any material other than cases."' Corbin
was once criticized for adding his own introductory text and footnotes
"to present the author's views or reasoning rather than as mirrors of
the authorities .... This is leading the student and sometimes it will
happen that he is led in a direction which the instructor will think is
erroneous." '126 Nonetheless, the casebook world has changed sub-
stantially since Corbin's day. Law professors now expect students to
grapple with commentary as well as cases, and to decide for themselves
what commentary is useful and what is not. To quote Cardozo
entirely out of context, law teaching "takes a broader view today. "127
123. See Kurt A. Strasser, Book Review, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 755, 759-60 (1983) ("My
primary criticism of Professor Farnsworth's treatise is not of its occasional use of a doctrinal
organization. Rather, my criticism is the book's failure ... to introduce ideas from the best of
modern contracts scholarship.").
124. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Book Review, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1223, 1245 (1984) ("In
this otherwise excellent book, Professor Farnsworth makes no attempt to resolve some basic
tensions created by contract theory."); cf. Charles L. Knapp, The Promise of the Future--and Vice
Versa: Some Reflections on the Metamorphosis of Contract Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 932, 937 (1984)
("Having identified all these trends in the law .... Farnsworth nowhere attempts to pull them
together into a larger pattern .... ").
125. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Casebooks and Scholarship: Confessions of an American
Opinion Clipper, 42 Sw. L. J. 903, 908 (1988).
126. Clarke B. Whittier, Book Review, 31 YALE L.J. 220, 222 (1921), quoted in id. at 908.
127. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
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III.
For all that, Farnsworth & Young is still a great book. It is well-
organized and well-written. The selection of cases is generally
excellent if occasionally capricious, and the editing of cases is crisp.
The notes and questions are pithy, thought-provoking, and on occasion
even funny. The problems are delightful, even if there are not enough
of them. The layout of the book is pleasing to the eye. Even the
compact size of the book is a plus: never has a one thousand-page
tome seemed so slim and easy to carry. (Indeed, to some of my
students, this is its chief virtue.) Yes, the fifth edition has made some
questionable "improvements" in case selection. Yes, the book would
be improved by the addition of some new scholarly voices, and more
generally by greater emphasis on scholarship. But these drawbacks can
be remedied with supplementary materials and class discussion. Make
no mistake about it: this book is a superb foundation for the first-year
course in contracts.
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